[Auto Probe] layout in China 40 years ago, Volkswagen aiming at Japanese automakers?
哈恩说，我们知道整个中国汽车工业爆发性的增长是在更晚的时候出现，但是我们早期奠定的这样一套基础设施，为后来爆发式的增长奠定了良好的基础。
70年代下半叶，大众汽车集团在亚洲创建第二根支柱的考虑渐渐成熟起来。
Hahn said, “as we all know, the explosive growth of the entire Chinese automotive industry came much later, but the infrastructure that Volkswagen built early on laid a good foundation for the boom followed.”
In the second half of 1970s, Volkswagen Group’ s thought of building the second mainstay in Asia gradually matured.
Carl Horst Hahn, the former Chairman of the Volkswagen Group
在汽车业界，但凡谈到改革开放，谈到引进技术，谈到合资合作，谈到国产化……就不能不谈到德国大众。由此，记者也被一个“谜”一样的问题所困扰：早在40年前，当几乎所有的跨国公司都对中国汽车工业说“NO”的时候，大众汽车为什么“不远万里，来到中国”？难道大众汽车是那个时代的白求恩吗？当然不可能，那又是为什么呢？
In the automotive industry, whenever it comes to the reform and opening-up, technology acquisition, joint venture and cooperation, and localization... The Volkswagen pops up spontaneously. Therefore, as a reporter, I am also troubled by a “mysterious” question: as early as 40 years ago, when almost all multinational companies said "NO" to the Chinese automotive industry, why Volkswagen came all the way to China? Was Volkswagen the Bethune of the age? Of course not, but why?
2018年，在纪念改革开放40周年时，记者对于这一谜题的破解也更加执着。12月中旬的一个午后，在北京老皇城根下的一个茶馆内，经济日报-中国经济网记者有机会向大众汽车集团前董事长卡尔-H-哈恩做了求证。
In the year of 2018, as marking the 40th anniversary of the reform and opening-up, I become more persistent in solving this mystery. In one afternoon of mid-December, I, a reporter of Economic Daily-China Economic Net, took the chance to verify my confusions to Carl Horst Hahn, the former Chairman of the Volkswagen Group, in a teahouse in Beijing.
记者的问题是：1982年-1992年，在哈恩博士担任大众汽车董事长期间，对于大众汽车进入中国市场，业界有两种截然不同的说法：
My question: during Dr. Hahn's tenure as the Chairman of Volkswagen from the year 1982 to 1992, there were two completely different opinions about Volkswagen’s entering the Chinese market:
一个说法是迫于当时的国际形势，比如欧美国家对南非的制裁，以及集团内部的调整和其他考量，大众汽车不得不做出到亚洲投资的选择；并且由于在韩国的投资没有谈成，最后才把项目落在中国。
One theory is that forced by the international situation at that time, such as the sanctions imposed by European and American countries against South Africa, the adjustments within the group and other considerations, Volkswagen had to make the choice of investing in Asia. Besides the failed negotiation with South Korea, the project was finally placed in China.
还有一种说法是在那个日本汽车开始风靡全球的年代，大众集团和哈恩博士就有欧美汽车企业一致的想法——抵制和对冲日本车企，为此就把战线前移到亚洲（最早是想在韩国投资），前移到中国。那么，事实到底是怎样的？
Another theory is that in the age of Japanese cars, Volkswagen Group and Dr. Hahn had the same thoughts with European and American automotive companies -- boycotting and hedging Japanese auto enterprises, so as to move the front line to Asia (Original idea is investing in South Korea) and to China. Then what's the truth on earth?
哈恩博士听后笑着回答：两种说法都是错的，我很高兴地告诉大家！说完他又大笑了一次。
Dr. Hahn laughed and said, “I am glad to tell you both theories are wrong!” Then he laughed again.
当然，在此次向哈恩博士当面求证过程中，记者所提问题也并非主观臆断。其中，第一个：迫于内外部形势，“不得不做出到亚洲投资的选择”之说，是来自日本汽车界人士的看法，也并非完全是出于诋毁或其他恶意。此次提问哈恩博士，当经济日报-中国经济网记者说出这一说法的出处，引得现场一片笑声。而第二个：“抵制和对冲日本车企，为此就把战线前移到亚洲（最早是想在韩国投资），前移到中国”之说，则是有哈恩自己和自己人的“佐证”。
Of course, in the interview with Dr. Hahn, the questions raised by reporter are not subjective assumptions. The first theory: forced by the external circumstances, “having no other choice but investing in Asia” is coming from a Japanese auto industry personnel, not originated from entire slander or other malice. As the reporter of Economic Daily-China Economic Net gave the sauce of the statement, the scene burst into laughter. The second theory: "boycotting and hedging Japanese auto enterprises, so as to move the front line to Asia (Original idea is investing in South Korea) and to China” is "proved" by Hahn and his colleagues.
讲到当年美国政府的政策，大众汽车集团与美国政府之间保持了适当的距离与合理的关系，与他们之间也没有任何问题，也不是我们考虑的因素。当时我们到中国来，是很幸运的，因为当时只有我们作为跨国汽车企业愿意到中国来。当时，绝大多数西方人都认为按中国社会当时的制度与状况，是不可能成功的，而且中国如果要发展汽车工业，也缺乏所需要的知识、技术等。
Speaking of the policies of the US government at that time, Volkswagen Group maintained a proper distance and reasonable relationship with the US government, and there was no issue between us, nor was it a factor we considered. As the only multinational auto company willing to China, we were lucky. Most westerners believed it was impossible to succeed under Chinese social system and status of the time, and China also lacked the necessary knowledge and technology to develop automotive industry.
哈恩说，我们与合资伙伴开始合作时，双方都没有退路，没有人给我们兜底，冒着巨大的风险。
Hahn said, when we started cooperation with our joint venture partners, neither side had a way out, and with no back-up, we both took enormous risks.
他分析道，我们和日本情况不一样。当时这个市场，在没有其他人来的情况下，我们就先来了。第一年做下来，卖了五千辆车，就占到整个市场份额的27%。当时有一些人不认同我的做法，说这样的市场没有任何的发展前景与空间，但是我仍然决定坚持，而且在与中方的合作中，我们发现中国人的学习速度非常快。同时，在与他们的合作中，我们也学习到很多东西。此外，还有一个非常重要的因素，中国政府的领导人不是由空想家或者拘泥于过去，他们中的大部分有理工科背景，都是工程师出身，而且非常急切地去学习外部世界的先进经验与最佳实践。（注：对于上海大众成立初期的产销量，经济日报-中国经济网记者在《汽车工业规划参考资料1996》等资料中查阅到：1985年至1987年，上海大众的产量分别为1733辆、8031辆和11000辆；同期，全国轿车产量分别为5207辆、12297辆和20865辆；上海大众三年占比分别为33.28%、65.31%和52.72%。尽管缺乏当时的销量数据，但上海大众第一年的产销量显然没有5000辆的规模；且产量在全国产量的“占比”数均远高于哈恩博士所说“市场份额的27%”）。
We are different from Japan, Hahn argued. When no one entering the market, we came first. 5000 cars were sold in the first year, accounting for 27% of the total market share. At that time, some people disagreed with my approach, saying such market had no development prospect and growth potential; however, I still decided to stick to it. Chinese are quick learners. In collaboration with Chinese side, we acquired knowledge simultaneously. Moreover, there is another significant factor. Chinese government leaders are not just daydreamers or sticking to the past. Most of them have science and engineering backgrounds and are eager to learn advanced experiences and best practices from the world. (Notes: based on the information the reporter of Economic Daily-China Economic Net found in Automobile Industry Planning Reference 1996: from the year 1985 to 1987, Shanghai Volkswagen produced 1733, 8031, and 11000 vehicles, respectively. During the same period, the domestic production of passenger cars was 5270, 12297, and 20865, in which the Shanghai Volkswagen proportion accounting for 33.28%, 65.31% and 52.72%, respectively. Despite the lack of sales data of the time, the production and sales volume in the first year was apparently not as large as 5000. And the “proportion” in the domestic production is far higher than what Dr. Hahn said-27% of the market.)
哈恩强调，我们在中国整个发展过程也是小规模的起步，按部就班，缓慢地向前推进。但是，我们非常注重为后面的发展奠定一套坚实的基础设施，到我25年前退休时，（大众汽车在）中国的产量仅仅达到10万辆，我们知道整个中国汽车工业爆发性的增长是在更晚的时候出现，但是我们早期奠定的这样一套基础设施，为后来爆发式的增长奠定了良好的基础。像今天，中国汽车产业的规模已经达到了三千万辆，我们也有420万辆的规模（注：哈恩博士退休的1992年，上海大众生产桑塔纳轿车65000辆，而1993年才达到100001辆，资料来源同上）。
Hahn stressed that Volkswagen started with small scale and moved forward slowly step by step in China. However, we attached great importance to laying a solid infrastructure for the future development. By the time I retired 25 years ago, Volkswagen’s output in China was only 100000.
As we all know, the explosive growth of the entire Chinese automotive industry came much later, but the infrastructure that Volkswagen built early on laid a good foundation for the boom followed. At the present, the production of China’s automotive industry has reached 30 million, while Volkswagen achieved 4.2 million. (Notes: in 1992, when Dr. Hahn retired, Shanghai Volkswagen produced 65000 Santana cars, and it was not until 1993 that the production reached 100001. Ibid) （文：经济日报-中国经济网记者 张宇星 译：张懿）
相关阅读：
【车海钩沉】 40年前，大众汽车为什么来中国（上）
【车海钩沉】 40年前，大众汽车为什么来中国（下）
【车海钩沉】大众40年前来中国，哈恩“功过”任评说
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